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Abstract 
 
China’s trade surplus is entirely in processing trade. Processed exports are final 
goods produced using parts and components coming from East Asian supply chain 
countries. Many claim that because much of the value added of China’s processed 
exports comes from East Asian countries, exchange rates in supply chain countries 
should affect China’s processed exports and the renminbi should not. To investigate 
these issues, this paper disaggregates processed exports into their two main 
categories—processing with imported materials (PWIM) exports and processing and 
assembly (PAA) exports. For PWIM exports, much of the value added comes from 
China, while for PAA exports, most of the value-added comes from supply chain 
countries. Dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) results indicate that East Asian 
exchange rates affect both types of exports and that the renminbi significantly affects 
PWIM exports but not PAA exports. Since PWIM exports are now six times the 
value of PAA exports, these results indicate that the renminbi matters for aggregate 
processed exports. 
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China is now the first or second largest trading partner for 78 countries and the world’s 
largest exporter of capital goods (IMF, 2011).  China’s surging exports and its exchange rate 
have elicited consternation from economists, workers, politicians, and pundits.    Many argue that 
China should let the renminbi appreciate to slow its export juggernaut.  How would a stronger 
RMB affect China’s exports? 
  As Yu (2011) noted, China’s entire trade surplus is in a customs regime called processing 
trade.   Imports for processing are intermediate inputs that are imported duty free to produce 
processed final goods for re-export.  Neither the imported inputs nor the final assembled goods 
can enter China’s domestic market.   China’s other major customs regime is called ordinary trade.  
Ordinary trade, which is now in deficit, includes imports and exports that do not receive special 
tariff treatment and that can enter China’s domestic market.   
Research into the effect of exchange rate changes on processed exports has yielded mixed 
results.  Cheung, Chinn, and Qian (2011), using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) 
techniques with quarterly data over the 1994 – 2010 period, reported that a 10 percent 
appreciation of the RMB would decrease China’s processed exports by about 10 percent.  
Thorbecke (2011), using DOLS estimation with quarterly data over the 1993-2008 period and the 
stock of FDI to control for foreign capital firms in China, reported that a 10 percent appreciation 
of either the renminbi or of the currencies of East Asian supply chain countries would reduce 
processed exports by about 17 percent.   On the other hand Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), 
using DOLS techniques with quarterly data over the 1993 – 2006 period and the capital stock to 
measure Chinese productive capacity, found that an appreciation of the RMB is associated with 
an increase in China’s processed exports (i.e., the coefficient has the wrong sign).   Xing and 3 
 
Detert (2010), accounting for the costs of manufacturing an iPhone, found that Chinese workers 
added only $6.50 of value to the total cost of $179 and concluded that an appreciation of the 
yuan would do little to reduce the demand for iPhones.   
Many have used Xing and Detert’s (2010) study and similar studies to conclude that the 
renminbi does not matter for rebalancing China’s processing trade.  Pilling (2011), for instance, 
quoted their study and argued that the renminbi is not important because “Many items 
supposedly made in China are just assembled in China….Most of the manufacturing cost 
comprises high-precision components made not in low-wage economies, but in high-wage ones 
such as Japan and South Korea.”   UNCTAD (2011) and the WTO (2011) have made similar 
points. 
Arguments such as these, however, may not be relevant for China today.  This can be 
seen by disaggregating China’s processing trade into its two main categories, processing and 
assembly (PAA) trade and processing with imported materials (PWIM) trade.  As Gaulier et al. 
(2005) discussed, the first category refers to foreign suppliers importing intermediate goods that 
belong to them and using these inputs to produce goods for re-export.  The second category 
refers to foreign suppliers importing inputs from other firms and using these to produce goods 
for re-export.  If following Tong and Zheng (2008) we measure value added in processing trade 
as the difference between processed exports and imports for processing, Figure 1a shows that 
China’s value-added in the first category is small and Figure 1b shows that China’s value-added 
in the second category is large.   PAA trade thus corresponds to Pilling’s (2011) description 
whereas PWIM trade does not. 
Figure 2 shows China’s trade balance in PAA trade and PWIM trade.  Its surplus in PAA 
trade is only about 10 billion US dollars and its surplus in PWIM trade exceeds 300 billion US 4 
 
dollars.
1  Koopman et al. (2008) noted that the effect of exchange rate changes in processing 
countries on trade volumes should depend on the share of domestic content in exports.  One 
would thus expect the renminbi to have a large effect on PWIM exports and a small or negligible 
effect on PAA exports.  One the other hand, one would expect exchange rates in supply chain 
countries to affect both categories since in both cases much of the value added comes from 
imported parts and components.   
To test whether this is so this paper extends the work of Thorbecke (2011).   He 
constructed an integrated exchange rate to measure how exchange rates affect the relative 
foreign currency cost not just of China’s value-added in processing trade but of China’s 
entire output of processed exports.  The integrated exchange rate is a weighted average of the 
renminbi exchange rate and the exchange rates in supply chain countries, with weights 
determined by the proportion of the value-added coming from China and from supply chain 
countries.  He reported that an appreciation of the integrated exchange rate would cause a 
large decrease in China’s processed exports.   
This paper uses Thorbecke’s (2011) approach, but examines the effect of exchange 
rate changes on PAA and PWIM exports separately.  While both types of exports should be 
affected by exchange rates in supply chain countries and thus by integrated exchange rates, 
PWIM exports should be affected much more than PAA exports by changes in the renminbi.   
The results reported here confirm this hypothesis.  Appreciations of the integrated 
exchange rate cause large drops in both PAA and PWIM exports.  In the case of PAA exports, 
this response is driven entirely by exchange rates changes in supply chain countries.  In the 
case of PWIM exports, this response is caused by changes in both the renminbi and the 
exchange rates in supply chain countries.   Changes in the RMB also have a larger effect than 
                                                 
1 These numbers are final values for 2010 and forecasts for 2011 based on data from January – August 2011. 5 
 
exchange rate changes in supply chain countries on PWIM exports.  Since China’s surplus is 
concentrated in PWIM trade, these results indicate that an RMB appreciation would 
contribute to rebalancing China’s processing trade. 
The next section presents the data and methodology.  Section 3 presents the results.  
Section 4 discusses the policy implications of the results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
   The imperfect substitutes model of Goldstein and Khan (1985) implies that export 
functions can be written as:  
    
t ex  = α10  + α11 t rer     + α12 t rgdp  +  εt ,                               (1) 
 
where  t ex  represents the log of real exports, t rer    represents the log of the real exchange rate, and 
rgdp represents the log of foreign real income. 
  To test for how exchange rates in China and in supply chain countries affect China’s 
exports it is necessary to measure China’s value-added in processing trade.  Following Tong and 
Zheng (2008), China’s value-added in processing trade can be measured as the difference 
between the value of China’s processed exports (VPEt) and the value of imports for processing 
from all supply chain countries (∑iVIPi,t): 
) 2 ( , / 1 / ) ( , , , t i t i t i t i t t Chin VPE VIP VPE VIP VPE VA      
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where  t Chin VA , equals China’s value-added in processing trade.  Each year data on the total value 
of processed exports and the total value of imports for processing are used to calculate China’s 
value-added.  These data are obtained from China Customs Statistics. 
  To calculate the share of total costs from other supply chain countries Thorbecke (2011) 
focused on the nine major providers of imports for processing.  These are Germany, Japan, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taipei,China, Thailand, and the United States.  
He calculated weights ( t i w , ) by dividing their contribution to China’s imports for processing by 
the amount of imports for processing coming from the nine major suppliers together.   He then 
used these weights together with data on China’s value-added to calculate an integrated 
exchange rate index ( t irer ) for the entire value (both domestically produced and imported) of 












t i t i
VA
t t t t
t i t Chin t Chin reer reer chinareer chinareer irer irer  
where  t chinareer is China’s real effective exchange rate at time t and  t i reer,  is the real effective 
exchange rate for supply chain country i at time t..  An increase in t chinareer,  t i reer, , and  t irer  
represent real exchange rate appreciations.   t irer  is set equal to 100 in 1992q4.  
Data on the real effective exchange rate for South Korea and Taiwan were taken from the 
Bank for International Settlements.   For the other countries, real exchange rate data were 
obtained from International Financial Statistics.
2 
As discussed above, data on imports for processing and processed exports were used to 
calculate China’s value-added ( t Chin VA , ).  Data on imports for processing disaggregated by 
                                                 
2  The websites for these data are: www.imf.org and www.bis.org.   7 
 
country were used to calculate the weights on supply chain countries ( t i w , ).  These data were 
obtained from China Customs Statistics.  
Data on China’s processing and assembly exports and processing with imported materials 
exports were obtained from the CEIC database.  These data are available monthly in U.S. dollars 
and were summed to obtain quarterly values. 
Following previous authors, exports were deflated in several ways.  The preferred 
specification employed the Hong Kong export price deflator (see Cheung, Chinn, and Qian, 2011, 
who only reported results using this measure). Since many of Hong Kong’s exports are re-
exports from China, this variable is a useful proxy for Chinese export prices.  Another 
specification, following Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), utilized the U.S. producer price index.  
A final specification, following Eichengreen et al. (2004), used the U.S. consumer price index. 
Thorbecke (2011) showed that the lion’s share of processed exports go to higher income 
countries.  Therefore quarterly data on income in North America, Europe, Japan, Australia, and 
South Korea were used to represent real income in the importing countries.
3    These data are 
seasonally adjusted and measured in real U.S. dollars.  They were obtained from the OECD.
4 
The stock of FDI and a WTO dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 after China 
joined the WTO are also included as independent variables.  Feenstra and Wei (2010) noted that 
84 percent of processed exports are produced by foreign-invested enterprises.  It is thus desirable 
to control for the stock of FDI.  Many have argued that China’s WTO accession had a positive 
effect on China’s processing trade.  Data on the stock of FDI were obtained from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.
5  The WTO dummy 
                                                 
3 Europe includes France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
4 The website for these data is http://stats.oecd.org 
5 The website is www.unctad.org.  The data are measured in U.S. dollars.  Following Eichengreen and Tong (2007), 
they were deflated using the U.S. consumer price index. 8 
 
variable was set equal to one starting in 2000, since Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2007) posited 
that China’s WTO accession began affecting China’s trade after it became certain that China 
would join the WTO in the beginning of 2000.  Further information on the data used here is 
available in Thorbecke (2011).  
The model was estimated using DOLS. 
6 This involves regressing the left-hand-side 
variable on a constant, the right hand side variables, and lags and leads of the first differences of 
the right hand side variables.  The equation has the form: 
) 4 ( , , , ,
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Here  t x  represents China’s real PAA or PWIM exports to the world,  t irer    represents the 
integrated real exchange rate index,  t rgdp  equals real income in the rest of the world,  t FDI  
represents the stock of foreign direct investment, WTO is the WTO dummy variable, and Time 
is  a time trend.  Seasonal dummy variables are also included.
7  t x , t irer   ,  t rgdp , and  t FDI  are 
measured in natural logs.     
  The same sample period that Thorbecke (2011) employed is used here.  These data 
extend from 1993Q1 to 2008Q4.  Equation (4) is estimated using a DOLS(2,2) model, implying 
that two leads and two lags of the first differences of the right hand side variables are employed. 
Thus the actual sample period for the estimation is 1993Q4 – 2008Q1. 
                                                 
6 Phillips-Perron unit root tests indicate that real PAA and PWIM exports, the integrated real exchange rate, and real 
income are all integrated of order one.  In addition, both the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics from Johansen 
cointegration tests indicate that there is one cointegrating relationship between real PAA or PWIM exports and these 
other variables.  Thus DOLS, a technique for estimating cointegrating relations, was employed. 
7 There were large unexplained drops in processed exports in the first quarter of 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996.  These 
were controlled for with a dummy variable. 9 
 
3.  RESULTS 
 
Tables 1-4 report the results from estimating equation (4).  In these tables the first two 
columns report the results for the preferred specification with exports deflated using the Hong 
Kong unit value index, the next two columns for exports deflated using the U.S. PPI, and the last 
two for exports deflated using the U.S. CPI.  Also in the tables, columns (1), (3), and (5) report 
results excluding a time trend and columns (2), (4), and (6) present results including a time trend.  
The probability values reported in the four tables indicate that all of the models pass Lagrange 
Multiplier tests for heteroskedasticity, fourth order serial correlation, and fourth order 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH).
8 
Table 1 reports the results with PAA exports as the left hand side variable.  The first row 
reports the income elasticities.  The preferred specification is in columns (1) and (2) with exports 
deflated using the Hong Kong unit value index.  The results are similar, though, in the other 
columns.  The income elasticity equals 5.76 in column (1) and 8.42 in column (2) and both 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  These results indicate that processed 
exports are very sensitive to income in the rest of the world.  Other investigators have reported 
similar findings for China’s processed exports.  Cheung, Chinn, and Qian (2011) reported 
income elasticities between 3.6 and 6.9, Thorbecke (2011) reported elasticities between 5.6 and 
7.9, and Ahmed (2009) found an income elasticity of 6.3.   
The second row of Table 1 reports results for the integrated exchange rate.  The 
coefficient on the integrated exchange rate equals -1.39 in column (1) and -1.88 in column (2).  
In both cases the estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
                                                 
8 The heteroskedasticity test is based on a regression of the squared residuals on the original regressors. 10 
 
The coefficient on the stock of FDI in China is not statistically significant.  This is not 
surprising since Figure 1a indicates that little of the value added of PAA exports comes from 
China. 
Table 2 reports results from estimating equation (4) with PAA exports as the left hand 
side variable but with the renminbi exchange rate and the exchange rates in supply chain 
countries included separately.  The income elasticities in the first row are similar to those 
reported in Table 1.  The coefficient on the exchange rate in supply chain countries in the second 
row now equals -1.45 in column (1) and -1.68 in column (2).  In both cases the p-value equals 
0.06.  The coefficients on the RMB exchange rate in the third row are close to zero and not 
statistically significant.  These results imply that, for processing and assembly exports, exchange 
rate appreciations in East Asian supply chain countries would cause a large drop in exports but 
an appreciation of the renminbi would not.   
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (4) with PWIM exports as the left 
hand side variable.  The income elasticity in the first row equals 8.46 in column (1) and 5.74 in 
column (2).  They are thus close to the values reported in Table 1.  In column (1) the coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and in column (2) the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.   
The second row of Table 3 reports results for the integrated exchange rate.  The 
coefficient on the integrated exchange rate equals -3.72 in column (1) and -3.22 in column (2).  
In both cases the estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   
Table 4 reports the results from estimating equation (4) with PWIM exports as the left 
hand side variable but with the renminbi exchange rate and the exchange rates in supply chain 
countries included separately.  The income elasticities in the first row are similar to those 11 
 
reported in Table 3.  The coefficient on the exchange rate in supply chain countries in the second 
row now equals -2.02 in column (1) and -1.83 in column (2).  The coefficient on the renminbi 
exchange rate in the third row now equals -2.51 in column (1) and -2.39 in column (2).  All four 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  These results imply that, for 
processing with imported materials exports, exchange rate appreciations in East Asian supply 
chain countries would cause a large drop in exports and an appreciation of the renminbi would 
cause an even larger drop.  The reason that the coefficient on the integrated exchange rate for 
PWIM exports in Table 3 is much larger than the coefficient on irer for PAA exports in Table 1 
is that for PWIM exports both exchange rates in supply chain countries and the renminbi matter 
while for PAA exports only exchange rates in supply chain countries matter.    
Interestingly, the coefficient on the stock of FDI in the fourth row of Table 4 is 
statistically significant (at least at the 10 percent level).  Since a large share of the value of 
PWIM exports is produced by foreign capital firms in China, it makes sense that the stock of FDI 
in China should have explanatory power.   
The important implication of these results is that the renminbi exerts important effects on 
PWIM exports.   Between January 2010 and August 2011, the value of PWIM exports was six 
times the value of PAA exports.  Thus these findings indicate that the renminbi matters for 
overall processed exports (i.e., the sum of PWIM and PAA exports).  Exchange rates in East 
Asian supply chain countries also affect processed exports.  Contrary to what some have argued, 





4.  DISCUSSION 
 
This paper presents evidence that exchange rates in both China and in East Asian supply 
chain countries exert major effects on processed exports.  These results make sense since much 
of the value-added comes from both China and from supply chain countries. 
While exchange rates throughout the region matter, there is little discussion between East 
Asian policy makers on exchange rate issues.  This lack of official interaction contrasts with the 
intensive private sector integration occurring within regional production networks. 
A useful first step would be for East Asian government officials to begin a dialogue on 
exchange rate issues.  This discussion could be undertaken by specialists behind closed doors.  
Eichengreen (2011) noted that discussions by specialists can facilitate policy coordination by 
insulating the process from politics. 
One issue that specialists could discuss is reserve accumulation.  If a country like China 
continues to accumulate reserves, this might encourage countries such as Malaysia, Taiwan, or 
Thailand that trade heavily with China or that compete with China in third markets to also 
continue accumulating reserves.  With many countries in the region holding more than enough 
reserves for precautionary reasons, it is not clear that further reserve accumulation is desirable.  
These domestic savings could be channeled to productive investments in the domestic economy 
such as rural sector education rather than earning low returns in external reserves such as US 
Treasuries.  Asian countries may need to coordinate together a move away from continued 
reserve accumulation.  In addition, countries with experience in this area could share lessons 
with other countries. 
Another issue that could be discussed would be whether a joint appreciation against the 
US dollar is desirable.  Massive exports within production networks to the US may be 13 
 
unsustainable.  It may thus be beneficial to target markets within Asia.  Appreciations within 
Asia would increase the purchasing power of consumers in the region and allow them to import 
more. 
A third issue to consider is exchange rate volatility.  Researchers have reported that 
exchange rate volatility reduces the flow of parts and components in the region.  Ito et al. (2008) 
found based on a survey of Japanese MNCs that intra-Asian exchange rate stability is crucial for 
the flow of parts and components within regional production networks. Thorbecke (2008) 
reported that exchange rate volatility deterred the flow of electronic parts and components within 
East Asian production networks. Hayakawa and Kimura (2009) found that exchange rate 
volatility reduced trade in intermediate goods within East Asian.    
A fourth issue is the wide exchange rate swings between countries that compete 
extensively.  For instance, the Korean won appreciated 30 percent against the Japanese yen 
between 2003 and the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in the summer of 2007.  It then 
depreciated almost 60 percent versus the yen between the summer of 2007 and the end of 2011.  
These huge exchange rate swings are disruptive to exporting industries in both countries.  While 
politicians often take a short-term perspective, one of the strengths of many East Asian countries 
is the ability to analyze situations from a longer term perspective.
9  Specialists insulated from 
political pressure could discuss whether these large swings in exchange rates are in the long run 
interests of the countries involved. If not, they could consider ways to moderate the exchange 
rate swings. 
Hopefully these behind the scenes interactions by economists and trained officials could 
point to a vision of how exchange rate policy in the region should evolve.  It may also point to 
                                                 
9 Li Ruogu, former Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, said, “How long is the short run, you ask?   
You must understand.   China is 8000 years old.   So when I say, short run, it could be 100 years.”  This quotation is 
cited in Frankel (2011). 14 
 
concrete steps that could be implemented by policy makers in the short and medium runs.  If so, 
this would help remedy the disconnect between uncoordinated exchange rate policies and the 
intense market driven integration in the region.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The IMF (2011) reported that China is now the first or second largest trading partner for 
78 countries, up from 13 countries in 2000.  It has also become the largest exporter of capital 
goods.  Many claim that this acceleration of China’s exports has been facilitated by an 
undervalued exchange rate and that the renminbi needs to appreciate. 
Others argue that China’s exchange rate is irrelevant since its surplus is entirely in 
processing trade.   For instance,  Pilling (2011) asserted that the renminbi does not matter 
because most of the manufacturing cost of China’s high wage items comes from countries such 
as Japan and South Korea.  UNCTAD (2011) and the WTO (2011) have made similar arguments. 
Given the concern over China’s export juggernaut, it is important to bring empirical 
evidence to bear on this issue.  To obtain this evidence, Thorbecke (2011) argued that it would 
be useful to examine separately China’s two main categories of processed exports, processing 
and assembly exports and processing with imported materials exports.  For PAA exports, Figure 
1a makes clear that almost all of the value-added comes from outside of China.  For PWIM 
exports, Figure 1b indicates that much of the value-added comes from within China. 
One would thus expect the renminbi to have a small or negligible effect on PAA exports 
but a larger effect of PWIM exports.  One would expect exchange rates in East Asian supply 
chain countries to have a large effect on both categories. 15 
 
This paper presents DOLS evidence confirming that this is true.   An appreciation of the 
renminbi would cause a large decrease in PWIM exports but would not affect PAA exports.  An 
appreciation in East Asian supply chain countries, however, would cause a large decrease in both 
PWIM and PAA exports. 
The share of domestic content in China’s processing exports has been increasing recently.  
Knight and Wang (2011) reported that China’s high investment levels in recent years have 
enabled firms to substitute foreign sources of intermediate products with domestic sources.   
Kuijs (2011) observed that China has developed deeper supply chains in the processing sector 
and that more of the value-added of processed exports can now be produced in China.  In 
addition, rising wages and the proliferation of industrial clusters indicate that China’s value-
added has been increasing rapidly.  This rise in value-added implies that the renminbi should 
matter even more for processed exports going forward. 
China faces difficult choices with its exchange rate policy.  It is committed to rebalancing 
away from an overdependence on exports.  However, an exchange rate appreciation could lead to 
expectations of future appreciations and speculative inflows.  A stronger renminbi would also 
lead to capital losses on China’s trillions of dollars of foreign exchange reserves.  It is unclear 
how policy makers should navigate through these shoals.   It is clear though from the results 
presented here that the renminbi significantly affects processed exports.  Thus, when debating 
policy options, economists and policy makers should not argue that because of processing trade 
the renminbi does not matter. 
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TABLE 1 
DOLS Estimates of China’s Processing and Assembly Exports over the 1993-2008 Period 

















U.S. CPI  U.S. CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rest of the 
World GDP 
5.76*** 8.42*** 4.55*** 7.37** 4.76***  8.08** 
(0.46) (2.74) (0.47) (3.01)  (0.47)  (2.77) 
Integrated 
RER 
-1.39*** -1.88***  -0.91*  -1.43**  -0.59  -1.20*** 
(0.47) (0.58) (0.47) (0.56)  (0.47)  (0.55) 
FDI Stock  -0.06 -0.08 0.12  0.10 0.07 0.05 
  (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
WTO 
Dummy 
-0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06  -0.06  -0.08* 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Time   -0.02  -0.02    -0.02 
   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.993 0.993 0.990 0.990  0.990  0.990 
SER  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
Serial Inde-   
pendence
a  0.36 0.34 0.37 0.36  0.27  0.20 
Hetero-    
skedasticity
b  0.86 0.80 0.75 0.64  0.69  0.49 
ARCH
c  0.58 0.38 0.51 0.25  0.63  0.23 
No. of 
observations  58 58 58 58  58  58 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  Rest of the World GDP is real, seasonally adjusted 
GDP in OECD countries.   Integrated RER is a weighted average of the renminbi exchange rate and the exchange 
rates in supply chain countries, with weights determined by the proportion of the value-added coming from China 
and from supply chain countries.  FDI Stock represents the stock of FDI in China, measured in US dollars and 
deflated using the US consumer price index.  WTO Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 beginning in 2000 
and 0 before this.    
aProbability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order serial 
correlation. 
b Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity from a regression of 
the squared residuals on the original regressors. 
c Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 
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TABLE 2 
DOLS Estimates of China’s Processing and Assembly Exports over the 1993-2008 Period 

















U.S. CPI  U.S. CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rest of the   6.19*** 8.34** 5.21*** 7.37**  5.42*** 7.84** 
World GDP  (0.68) (3.19) (0.70) (3.37)  (0.68)  (3.15) 
Supplier’s   -1.45* -1.68* -1.39* -1.62*  -1.21*  -1.48* 
RER  (0.73) (0.86) (0.70) (0.85)  (0.70)  (0.82) 
RMB RER  -0.18 -0.34 0.23  0.07 0.20  -0.02 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
FDI Stock  -0.36 -0.30 0.34 -0.28  -0.40  -0.33 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
WTO   -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04  -0.06  -0.07 
Dummy  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Time   -0.01  0.01   -0.02 
   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.993 0.993 0.990 0.995  0.990  0.989 
SER  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
Serial Inde-   
pendence
a  0.38 0.34 0.33 0.33  0.28  0.24 
Hetero-    
skedasticity
b  0.83 0.83 0.91 0.90  0.78  0.76 
ARCH
c  0.53 0.48 0.44 0.51  0.48  0.49 
No. of 
observations  58 58 58 58  58  58 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  Rest of the World GDP is real, seasonally adjusted 
GDP in OECD countries.  Supplier’s RER is the real exchange rate in supply chain countries, calculated by 
weighing real exchange rate changes in individual supply chain countries by each countries’ value-added in 
processed exports. RMB RER is the RMB real effective exchange rate.  FDI Stock represents the stock of FDI in 
China, measured in US dollars and deflated using the US consumer price index.  WTO Dummy is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 beginning in 2000 and 0 before this.    
aProbability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order serial 
correlation. 
b Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity from a regression of 
the squared residuals on the original regressors. 
c Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 18 
 
TABLE 3 
DOLS Estimates of China’s Processing with Imported Materials Exports over the 1993-2008 
Period 

















U.S. CPI  U.S. CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rest of the 
World GDP 
8.46*** 5.74* 7.25*** 4.69 7.46***  5.40 
(0.39) (3.07) (0.39) (2.96)  (0.40)  (3.24) 
Integrated 
RER 
-3.72*** -3.22*** -3.24*** -2.77***  -2.92***  -2.54*** 
(0.41) (0.64) (0.40) (0.61)  (0.42)  (0.67) 
FDI Stock  -0.12 -0.09 0.06  0.08 0.02 0.04 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
WTO 
Dummy 
0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02  -0.01  -0.00 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Time   0.02  0.02    0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.996 0.996 0.997 0.998  0.997  0.997 
SER  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05  0.05  0.05 
Serial Inde-   
pendence
a  0.54 0.54 0.47 0.57  0.49  0.53 
Hetero-    
skedasticity
b  0.81 0.64 0.80 0.82  0.74  0.67 
ARCH
c  0.40 0.67 0.41 0.28  0.70  0.75 
No. of 
observations  58 58 58 58  58  58 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  Rest of the World GDP is real, seasonally adjusted 
GDP in OECD countries.   Integrated RER is a weighted average of the renminbi exchange rate and the exchange 
rates in supply chain countries, with weights determined by the proportion of the value-added coming from China 
and from supply chain countries.  FDI Stock represents the stock of FDI in China, measured in US dollars and 
deflated using the US consumer price index.  WTO Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 beginning in 2000 
and 0 before this.    
aProbability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order serial 
correlation. 
b Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity from a regression of 
the squared residuals on the original regressors. 
c Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. 
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TABLE 4 
DOLS Estimates of China’s Processing with Imported Materials Exports over the 1993-2008 
Period 

















U.S. CPI  U.S. CPI 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Rest of the   7.15*** 5.43* 6.17*** 4.46 6.38*** 4.92 
World GDP  (0.49) (2.87) (0.51) (2.95)  (0.51)  (2.98) 
Supplier’s   -2.02*** -1.83*** -1.95*** -1.77** -1.78*** -1.62** 
RER  (0.55) (0.67) (0.58) (0.69)  (0.60)  (0.71) 
RMB RER  -2.51*** -2.39*** -2.10*** -1.97*** -2.13***  -2.02*** 
  (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) (0.34)  (0.38)  (0.37) 
FDI Stock  0.50* 0.45*  0.52 0.47* 0.46 0.42 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.27) (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.27) 
WTO   -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  -0.05  -0.05 
Dummy  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Time   0.01  0.01    0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.998 0.998 0.997 0.997  0.997  0.997 
SER  0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04  0.04  0.04 
Serial Inde-   
pendence
a  0.22 0.23 0.33 0.33  0.21  0.23 
Hetero-    
skedasticity
b  0.79 0.88 0.69 0.81  0.81  0.89 
ARCH
c  0.73 0.94 0.91 0.98  0.74  0.90P 
No. of 
observations  58 58 58 58  58  58 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level.  Rest of the World GDP is real, seasonally adjusted GDP in OECD 
countries.  Supplier’s RER is the real exchange rate in supply chain countries, calculated by weighing real exchange rate changes 
in individual supply chain countries by each countries’ value-added in processed exports. RMB RER is the RMB real effective 
exchange rate.  FDI Stock represents the stock of FDI in China, measured in US dollars and deflated using the US consumer price 
index.  WTO Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 beginning in 2000 and 0 before this.    
aProbability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order serial correlation. 
b Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity from a regression of the squared 
residuals on the original regressors. 
c Probability values from a Lagrange Multiplier test for the null hypothesis that there is no fourth order autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity.  20 
 
FIGURE 1a 
Value of China’s Processing and Assembly Exports and Imports, 1993-2011 
 
Source: CEIC Database 




































Value of China’s Processing with Imported Materials Exports and Imports, 1993-2011 
 
Source: CEIC Database 






































China’s Trade Surplus in Processing and Assembly Trade and Processing with Imported 
Materials Trade, 1993-2011 
 
Source: CEIC Database 
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